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NoT-So-SuRREPTITious
UCC: AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY

AND

ADJUSTMENT OF THE

Peter A. Alces*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Legal paradigms are slow to shift, and it is often some time
before the contributions of legal scholars are recognized as crucial.
Although those concerned with commercial law can look to the
drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)l and appreciate
the UCC's importance, contemporary developments seldom have a
similar impact.2 Every so often, however, there is a development of
manifest significance. New UCC Article 2A-Leases is such a development. This symposium issue of the Alabama Law Review
* A.B. 1977, Lafayette College; J.D. 1980, University of illinois. Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri; Associate Professor of Law, The
University of Alabama. The author wishes to thank Yvonne Brown (J.D., Washington University, 1988) and Joshua Schindler (J.D., Washington University, 1988) for their valuable
research and editorial assistance.
1. The Code project began in earnest in the 1940s and continued through the 1950s.
See GENERAL CoMMENT OF NAT'L CoNF. OF Com1'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws AND THE ALI,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1978 OFFICIAL TExT WITH COMMENTS.
2. For example, consider the Uniform New Payments Code (UNPC) which was to be a
comprehensive and preemptive statute that would treat comparable payment media similarly. It was sponsored by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Only a few years after its initiation, however, the
project was abandoned by the sponsors. See AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE. 1958 ANNUAL REPoRT
15-16.
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places Article 2A in its historical context3 and begins the scholarly
perusal of the new law.
Although several portions of the Code have been amended,•
Article 2A is important because it represents the first successful
effort to bring another body of commercial law within the scope of
the UCC. It may mark the beginning of the recodification of commercial law in the United States.!~ The fact that Article 2A may
become law in the next few years6 indicates that something important is happening now, something which will change the way of
thinking about commercial laws.
Substantial adjustment of existing portions of the UCC as well
as the promulgation of whole new Articles of the Code currently
preoccupy commercial transactors. In the course of the next few
years, virtually every substantive Article of the UCC will be subject to either pervasive amendment or complete redrafting.'7 The
commercial community's increasing uneasiness with a good deal of
existing sales law is evidenced by the fact that several provisions of
Article 2A change the formulation of their Article 2 analogues for
reasons independent of essential differences between sales and
lease transactions. Article 3 of the UCC is currently the subject of
an extensive review process which likely will culminate in extensive
amendments recasting the jurisprudential foundations of commer3. See Boss, The History of Article 2A: A Lesson for Practitioner and Scholar Alike,
39 ALA. L. REV. 575 (1988).
4. Article 9. of the UCC was substantially amended in 1972, at which time minor ad·
justments were also made to§§ 1-105, 1-201, 2-107, and 5-116. See GENERAL COMMENTS ON
THE APPROACH OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9, 1972 OFFICIAL TEXT SHOWING
CHANGES MADE IN FoRMER TExT oF ARTicLE 9, SECURED TRANSACTIONS, AND OF RELATED
SECTIONS AND REASONS FOR CHANGES. In 1977 Article 8 was also revised. Conforming adjustments were also made to§§ 9-103, 9-105, 9-203, 9-302, 9-304, 9-305, 9-309, 9-312, 1·201, and
5-114. See REPORTER'S INTRODUCTORY COMMENT, 1977 OFFICIAL TEXT OF ARTICLE 8, INVEST•

MENT SECURITIES AND OF RELATED SECTIONS AND REASONS FOR CHANGES.
5. The theory of the proposed [UCC] is that we must keep our statutes up to date.
If the project is successfully carried through, we should understand that we have
probably committed ourselves to basic revisions at fairly short time intervals. How·
ever excellent the new Code may be, it will no doubt be necessary, in another twenty·
five years or so, to revise the revisions.
Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J. 1341, 1359 (1948);
see also G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95-98 (1977).
6. However, at the time of this writing, South Carolina, Louisiana, and Vermont still
have not adopted the 1972 amendments to Article 9.
7. Article 9 may be safe in light of its fairly recent amendment in 1972. See supra note
4.
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cial paper law.8 The Federal Reserve Board has adopted
regulations that will significantly alter the law governing the check
collection process while the process of amending Article 4
continues.8 •1
In the near future a new Article 4A may govern wire trans9
fers. While wire transfers move more value than any other
payment medium, they are currently governed only by commonlaw principles, private agreements, and less than comprehensive
federal regulations. Article 4A, then, insofar as it endeavors to fill
that void is certainly conceived in the spirit of Article 2A, which,
as promulgated, addresses many unresolved issues. Article 5 is also
currently the subject of an extensive review that may result in a
readjustment of the law governing letters of credit. 1° Furthermore,
a new version of Article 6 may soon surface that could very well
change the status quo in the bulk sales law. 11 Article 6, "Bulk
Transfers," has been the subject of a review committee's attention
for almost a decade, and the preliminary proposals coming out of
that committee suggest that that portion of the Code may be reformulated in ways that profoundly will affect the bulk sales calculus
and its relationship to the law of fraudulent dispositions.12
8. "Article 3 is the most dated article of the U.C.C. It relies heavily on the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments law that it replaced, and some of its concepts are as archaic as its
language." NAT'L CoNF. OF CoMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws. AMENDME.NTS TO UNIFORM
CoMMERciAL CoDE ARTICLES 3, 4, 4A: CURRENT PAYMENT~fETHODS AND WJRE TRANsFERS
(PREFATORY NoTE) (July 31, 1987 draft). For discussions of the evolving jurisprudence of the
payments law, see Alces, A Jurisprudential Perspective for the True Codification of Payments Law, 53 FoRDHAM L. REv. 83 (1984) (recommending focus on "essential" principles);
Alces, Toward A Jurisprudence of Bank-Customer Relations, 32 WAYNE L. REv. 1279 (1980)
(offering comparison of jurisprudential bases of UCC Articles 2 and 4) [hereinafter Alces,
Toward A Jurisprudence]; Cooter & Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer
Payments, 66 TEX. L. REv. 63 (1987) (providing analytic framework for loss allocation in the
payment system and proposing use of that framework to identify rules for drafting
legislation).
8.1 52 Fed. Reg. 47,112 (1987) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 229) (proposed Dec. 11,
1987).
9. Miller, Ballen, Davenport & Vergari, Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits and Collections, and Commercial Electronic Fund Transfers (U.C.C. Annual Survey), 42 Bus. LAw.
1269, 1288-91 (1987).
10. Author's telephone interview with John F. Dolan, Professor of Law, Wayne State
University (Jan. 20, 1987).
11. See Harris, The Article 6 Drafting Committee's New Approach to Asset Acquisitions, 42 Bus. LAw. 1261 (1987).
12. Also, as of this writing, the recently promulgated Uniform Fraudulent. Transfer
Act, in less than two years, has become law in sixteen states. See Alces, Generic Fraud and
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 9 CARDozo L. REv. 743, 745 n.8 (1987) (listing states
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Another significant, and perhaps more problematic, development is the creeping "federalization" of commercial law. Grant
Gilmore saw it coming years ago. 13 A recent example of federalization is the Food Security Act's14 effective repeal of the farm
products exception in section 9-307,15 and proposed Federal Reserve Board Regulation CC,16 which would displace a great deal of
Article 4 to accommodate more expeditious funds availability. The
federal government's efforts to draft commercial law have not
proven unassailable. Any student of the commercial law can recognize the difference between UCC formulations and provisions of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 or the Federal Food Security
Act. 17 So these are exciting times, as commercial law goes, and the
Article 2A project, as well as the contributions to this Symposium,
should be read as a barometer of the change in perspective concerning state codification of uniform commercial law.
It is necessary that practitioners and academicians develop a
frame of reference to facilitate their understanding and appraisal
of commercial law developments. Amendments to existing provisions of the UCC, both those promulgated by the Permanent
Editorial Board as well as those passed by several states on a
nonuniform basis, do not present the same challenges to commercial sensibilities as does the advent of Article 2A. To accommodate
a focus on the big picture, this short introductory essay suggests an
approach for the co~ercial community's evaluation of the Article
2A project. This introduction will emphasize the academic perspective. The focus here is on the jurisprudential significance of Article
2A from the view of those who only grudgingly give up on the idea
and statutory citations). If experience with that legislation provides a reliable indicator, new
uniform commercial statutes may receive expeditious consideration by state legislatures af.
ter their promulgation by the sponsoring organizations.
13. See G. GILMORE, supra note 5, at 92-96.
14. Federal Food Security Act of 1980, 7 U.S.C. § 1631 (Supp. III 1985). For criticism
of the Act, see Richards, Federal Preemption of the U.C.C. Farm Product Exception: Buyers Must Still Beware, 15 STETSON L. REv. 371 (1986) and Meyer, Congress' Amendments
to the U.C.C.: The Farm Products Rule Change, 55 J. KAN. B.A. 17 (1986).
15. u.c.c. § 9-307 (1987).
16. 52 Fed. Reg. 47,112 (1987) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 229) (proposed Dec. 11,
1987).
17. It would seem that the very same results effected by the federal regulation, which
runs several pages in length, could have been accomplished by simply deleting the words
"other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations"
from current § 9-307(1).
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that there is, or at least could be, some fundamental and consistently applied method of elucidating the UCC. How, in short, does
Article 2A affect that idea, and how do the articles in this Symposium shed light on that crucial inquiry?
Donald Rapson, General Counsel of the C.I.T. Corporation,
member of the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code, and distinguished academician, recognized the
significant development represented by Article 2A. Two years ago
he expressed concern that· this first new Article of the UCC could
very well become law without ever being exposed to the type of
scholarly examination generally afforded important legal developments. The Article 2A project has progressed steadily over the last
several years without attracting the attention that, for example,
the Uniform New Payments Code (UNPC) attracted. 18 That is a
particularly curious circumstance insofar as the UNPC never really
came close to becoming law19 while Article 2A was assured promulgation virtually from its inception.
This Symposium was conceived from Donald Rapson's observation and suggestion that the journals would do well to bring
Article 2A to the attention of the commercial community. Because
the Symposium project began before all of the Text and Comments
to Article 2A were completed, the contributors have been updating
their manuscripts during the course of the last eighteen months or
so to reflect the drafting committee's adjustments to Article 2A.20
The articles collected here uncover traps for the unwary in Article 2A and otherwise provide a primer to the operation of the
new Article. As will be seen, the contributors have not been reluctant to expose a glitch or two that may be significant in the course
of litigation or during the transaction-negotiation process. In that
18. The several articles concerning the UNPC include Benfield, The New Payments
Code and the Abolition of Holder in Due Course Status as to Consumer Checks. 40 \VASIL
& LEE L. REv. 11 (1983); Geary, One Size Doesn't Fit All-Is a Uniform Payments Code a
Good Idea?, 9 RUTGER COMPUTER & TEca L.J. 337 (1983); Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers
and the Uniform New Payments Code, 83 CoLUr.L L. REv. 1664. 1668-69 (1983); Vergari. A
Critical Look at the New Uniform Payments Code, 9 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TEcu. L.J. 317
(1983).

19. But preliminary indications are that amendments to Article 3 of UCC may be get·
ting quite close to formulations that first appeared in the UNPC. See REPoRTER's
ExPLANATORY DRAFT OF ARTICLE 3 (Nov. 4, 1987).
20. Ronald DeKoven, the Reporter of Article 2A, wrote the Comments to Article 2A
throughout most of 1987, and the last draft was not available until the early fall of 1987.
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regard, it would be appropriate to consider this Symposium a jurisprudential undertaking, in the most practical sense, that is.
II. A

SUGGESTED PERSPECTIVE

Article 2A soon should have an impact upon commercial law
casebooks, particularly those focusing solely or primarily on Article
2,21 and, in turn, should affect traditional sales courses, either the
first-year contracts adjunct or the separate upper level elective. It
now is no longer appropriate, if it ever was, to view Article 2 as an
application of state of the art contract principles. Uniform statutory treatment of lease contracts, which are no less contracts than
sales contracts, now exists, and Article 2A does not always follow
the Article 2 formulations. Law students should now appreciate
the Uniform Commercial Code differently. An introduction to Article 2, as a refinement or at least a modification of common-law
contract principles, no longer tells the complete story. For instance, in deciding how much teaching time should be devoted to
the battle of the forms provision, section 2-207,22 both in the contracts course and in the sales course, it would be inappropriate to
ignore the fact that Article 2A contains no parallel provision.
Although the Official Comments to several Article 2A provisions that do not track their Article 2 analogues often explain the
divergence by stating that the Article 2A provisions have been "revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology,"23 there is reason
to be skeptical of that explanation. Certainly the terms "buyer"
and "seller" must be changed to "lessor" and "lessee," but it is not
so clear that all of the departures from the statutory analogues
were prompted by such benign considerations.24
21. In a casebook to be published by Matthew Bender & Co., P. ALcEs & N. HANSFORD,
BULK TRANSFERS (forthcoming 1989), an attempt is made to expose students to Articles 2 and 2A in a way that will raise the important issues concerning the two
Articles' coexistence, as well as similarities and differences.
22. u.c.c. § 2-207 (1987).
23. See, e.g., id. § 2A-220 comment ("rephrased and new material added to conform to
leasing terminology and practice"); id. § 2A-221 comment (same); id. § 2A-308 comment
(same); id. § 2A-309 comment ("revised to reflect leasing terminology and to add new
material").
24. For instance, the § 2A-201 statute of frauds does not follow its Article 2 analogue;
the Article 2A provision contains no special rule for merchants such as that found in § 2201(2). The drafters explain that the special merchant rule "was not included in this section

SALES, LEASES, AND
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Law professors will have to qecide how to divide Article 2A
coverage between sales and secured transactions materials. Insofar
as the new Article clearly owes a great deal to both Articles 2 and 9
and raises important issues concerning the relationship between
Article 2A and Articles 22 (5 and 9,26 it would be a mistake not to
treat the leasing Article in both sales and secured transactions
courses. That observation suggests a fundamental jurisprudential
problem: because Article 2 was drafted from one perspective (primarily Karl Llewellyn's) and Article 9 was drafted from another
(primarily Grant Gilmore's), is there reason to believe that the
product of that statutory combination will be viable? Professor
Harris's contribution to this Symposium suggests that in some instances the Article 2A formulation which emerges from a
combination of the Article 2 and Article 9 statutory analogues is,
at least, troublesome, or may prove so in certain circumstances.27
Perhaps most notably, the revision to section 1-201(37)28 may
have ramifications pertinent to both sales law and secured transactions law. The proposed revision of the definition of a security
interest is a means of distinguishing a true lease from the so-called
"security lease," a secured transaction disguised as a lease. Now
that Articles 2 and 2A will co-exist as almost parallel enactments,
it will be necessary to distinguish a sale from a lease in order to
decide which Article of the UCC applies.29 Even though the economic perspective of revised section 1-201 does address the
particular issues of concern in making the Article 9 versus Article
2A characterization, students of commercial law and, in time, the
courts will be forced to confront a larger issue: whether a particular
Article 2A formulation differing from its Article 2 analogue should
provide the rule of decision or whether recourse should be made to
the sales rule. The possibility that the analysis of that characterization will determine the outcome of any particular case is real.
There also remains the question of what impact Article 2A will
as the number of such transactions involving leases, opposed to sales, was thought to be
modest." U.C.C. § 2A-201 comment (1987).
25. See Rapson, Deficiencies and Ambiguities in Lessors' Remedies Under Article 2A:
Using Official Comments to Cure Problems in the Statute, 39 ALA. L. REv. 875 (1988).
26. See Harris, The Rights of Creditors Under Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. REv. 803 (1988).
27. See id.
28.
§ 1-201(37) (1987).
29. Section 2-106, defining "sale," will also pertain: "A •sate' consists in the passing of
title from the seller to a buyer for a price (Section 2-401)."

u.c.c.
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have on true "Code" methodology. In a salient article written over
a quarter of a century ago, Chancellor Hawkland described the
consequences of concluding that the UCC is a true "Code," so far
as applying its several Articles is concerned.30 Article 2 introduces
law students to argument by analogy and other devices of statutory interpretation. In cases which straddle both Article 2 and
Article 2A but fall squarely within the scope of neither enactment,
which of these Articles should provide the basis for argument by
analogy? The drafters note in one of the first Comments to Article
2A that
[a] court may apply this Article by analogy to any transaction,
regardless of form, that creates a lease of personal property other
than goods, taking into account the expressed intentions of the parties to the transaction and any differences between a lease of goods
and a lease of other property. Such application has precedent as the
provisions of the Article on Sales ... have been applied by analogy
to leases of goods.... Whether such application would be appropriate for other bailments of personal property, gratuitous or for hire,
should be determined by the facts of each case.31

Because the efficacy of Code methodology is now more uncertain,
it may be necessary to circumscribe severely the limits of reliance
on some familiar approaches to the UCC.
The Official Comments to several Article 2A provisions acknowledge that the drafters have departed from the Article 2
analogue in order to improve upon the uniform sales law.32 To
guide their decisions as to which provisions of Article 2 would be
grafted onto the lease law "warts and all" and which provisions
were sufficiently objectionable to require adjustment, the drafting
committee utilized a subjective measure.33 Reasonable people may
30. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291, 292
("A 'code' is a pre-emptive, systematic, and comprehensive enactment of a whole field of
law.").
31. U.C.C. § 2A-102 comment (1987) (citing Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 92 Wash. 2d
40, 46-48, 593 P.2d 1308, 1312 (1979)); see also Hawkland, The Impact of the Uniform
Commercial Code on Equipment Leasing, 1972 U. ILL. L . REv. 446; Murray, Under the
Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FoRDHAM L. REV. 447
(1971).
32. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2A-214 comment (1987); id. § 2A-216 comment; id. § 2A-503
comment; id. § 2A-506 comment.
33. See Harris, supra note 26, at 816-17 n.48 (discussion of the "gag rule" in the drafting of Article 2A).
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disagree with some of the choices made by the drafters and will
wonder why some sales provisions were changed while others were
left in their current deficient form.
Commentators will address the consequences of the drafters'
choices,34 but the concern here is with the larger pedagogical question. When a court is faced with an issue arising under one of the
imperfect Article 2 provisions that has been incorporated into Article 2A without amendment, is it appropriate for the court to
conclude that the perhaps questionable interpretations of that deficient provision are confirmed by the drafters' failure to adjust the
section in Article 2A, particularly when the drafters did depart
from some dubious Article 2 formulations in the new lease Article?
Essentially, the problem is one of which the parties involved in the
Article 2A drafting process were well aware: their mandate was to
write a uniform lease law, one which would draw upon Code analogues; they were not asked to amend Article 2 at the same time.36
The fact that the drafters were only doing what was asked of them
does not obviate the quandary facing the commercial bar as new
interpretive issues arise from both Article 2A and the "settled"
sales law. It might very well have been better had the drafters of
Article 2A not changed any of the Article 2 sections they chose to
incorporate into the uniform lease law.
The articles in this Symposium by Amy Boss36 and Edwin
Huddleson37 describe both the Article 2A project generally and the
particular interests accommodated during the drafting process.
They each explain the forces that brought ~he process to fruition
and provide some insight into the inferences which may be drawn
from the drafters' conclusions. Charles Mooney's piece also helps
explain how the commercial landscape at the time Article 2A was
drafted influenced the drafters' decision not to impose a filing requirement in lease cases. And that is a question worth treating in
some depth, as Professor Mooney does. The articles remind readers that the new uniform lease law, like all statutes, is a product of
its time and, necessarily, may be better appreciated if the status
quo and preoccupations of the contemporary commercial world are
34. See, e.g., id. at 817 n.49, 834 n.l19.
35. See Boss, supra note 3, at 601; Huddleson, Old Wine in New Bottles: UCC Article
2A-Leases, 39 ALA. L. REv. 615, 620 (1988).
36. See Boss, supra nate 3.
37. See Huddleson, supra note 35.
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explored. To an extent, Article 2A was written and promulgated
because of profound changes in the way commercial transactors
conduct business. Financial considerations beyond the UCC have
encouraged sophisticated commercial transactors to lease, rather
than sell, personal property. As leasing has evolved, it has
presented new challenges to the commercial bar. To the extent
that the articles in this Symposium explain something about the
drafting process and provide insight into the legal landscape at the
instant the drafters of Article 2A were settling upon a particular
rule, they facilitate interpretations of the new law.
Professor Mooney's article does such a thorough job of responding to the Baird and Jackson ostensible ownership thesis38
that it prompts rethinking about public filing requirements. In
that way another aspect of this Symposium's contribution emerges:
the discussion of the balance of interests struck by certain aspects
of Article 2A encourages an appraisal of the assumptions underlying commercial law. 39
Professor Homer Kripke's contribution questions the Article
2A drafters' choice of statutory analogue40 and thereby invites critical reconsideration of the new Article's foundations. Just as
Frederick Beutel's criticisms of the UCC project revealed many of
the inadequacies of the Code still present today,41 Professor
Kripke focuses attention on problems with Article 2A that may remain for some time to come.
In addition to the contributors' treatment of the historical
backdrop against which Article 2A was promulgated, their observations regarding the style and approach of Article 2A stimulate
debate over the place of commercial law in the grand scheme of
38. See Baird & Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of
Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REv. 175 (1983).
39. For treatment of an analogous fundamental assumption, compare Gilmore, The
Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 Y.u.E L.J. 1057 (1954) (describing commercial justification for "good faith purchaser") with Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase
Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L.
REv. 605 (1981) (questioning efficacy of "good faith purchaser" concept in modern commercial law).
40. Kripke, Some Dissonant Notes About Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. REV. 791, 791-93
(1988).

61

41. See Beutel, The Proposed Uniform[?] Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted,
L.J. 334 (1952).

yALE
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"matters legal. "'2 Karl Llewellyn was the principal draftsman of
the UCC, not just because he was a commercial law scholar, but
because he was concerned with very fundamental and practical jurisprudential inquiries. Article 2 posits the jurisprudential issue of
how much direction a statute need provide the courts in order to
unburden commercial transactions and still render the best result
in litigated cases. Just as the UCC originally was conceived as a
means to give effect to transactor expectations and law merchant
principles,43 Article 2A recognizes the benefits of drafting to accommodate the Grand Style'' of adjudication and relies on a
"sense of the situation""~ to reveal the best result on the facts of a
particular case.46 The contributors to this Symposium recognize
this and provide insight into Article 2A's relationship to the Llewellyn tradition. In particular, Professor Harris maintains a steady
(and healthy) preoccupation with the underlying principles and
policies that pervade the UCC.47 Those principles and policies are
at least consistent with, if not in fact a product of, the Llewellynesque perspective.
For several reasons it is worthwhile to judge Article 2A by the
standards established in Article 2. First, many Article 2A provisions obviously are based on Article 2 analogues. Second, by their
own admission the drafters of 2A were trying to write law in the
Llewellyn style-focus on the facts,48 provide the court with the
contours of a rule, and do not impose artificial restrictions by the
use of formalistic language.49 Third, even though Karl Llewellyn
was an academic commercial law scholar, he immersed himself in
42. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 CoLUM. L. REv. 431,432
(1930) ("I have no desire to exclude anything from matters legaL").
43. See Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should it be Enacted?, 59
YALE L.J. 821,822-24 (1950); Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor
Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364, 365 (1952).
. 44. SeeK LLEWELLYN, THE CoMMON LAw TRADmoN 430-37 (1960) (discussing Judge
Cardozo's use of the Grand Style).
45. For a discussion and appraisal of Llewellyn•s legal realism in the commercial law,
see Alces, Toward a Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at 1299 & n.92.
46. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2A-518 comment (1987) (''Thus, the decision of whether the new
lease agreement is substantially similar to the original will be determined case by case."'); id.
§ 2A-504 comment ("Whether the inclusion of these formulae will affect the classification of
the transaction as a lease or a security interest is to be determined by the facts of each
case.").
47. See id. § 1-102.

48. See supra note 46.
49. See Alces, Toward a Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at 1324-27.
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the practice of commercial law before presuming to write better
sales law. ~o Ronald DeKoven, the principal architect of Article 2A,
is a distinguished practitioner who, like Llewellyn before him, recognized that a sense of the commercial dynamic is indispensable to
drafting commercial law in a way that will accommodate adjudication in the Grand Style.~~
Consider, for example, the lessor's remedial provision in Article 2A permitting the lessor to recover damages upon the lessee's
breach when the lessor has re-leased goods pursuant to a "substantially similar" lease.~ The pertinent Official Comment explains:
2

While the section does not draw a bright line, it is possible to
describe some of the factors that should be considered in a finding
that a new lease agreement is substantially similar to the original.
The various elements of the new lease agreement should be examined. Those elements include the term of the new lease (because
the damages are calculated under subsection (2) as the difference
between the total rent payable for the entire term of the new lease
agreement and the remaining lease term of the original lease); the
options to purchase or release; the lessor's representations, warranties and covenants to the lessee as well as those to be provided by
the lessee to the lessor; and the services, if any, to be provided by
the lessor or by the lessee. All of the factors allocate cost and risk
between the lessor and the lessee and thus affect the amount of rent
to be paid. These findings should not be made with scientific precision, as they are a function of economics, nor should they be made
independently, as it is important that a sense of commercial judgment pervade the finding. Gs
50. Karl Llewellyn practiced, for a time, with the Wall Street law firm of Shearman &
Sterling. See W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MoVEMENT 101 (1973).

51. Ronald DeKoven is a partner with the firm of Shearman & Sterling.
52.

U.C.C. § 2A-527(2) (1987) provides:

(2) ... if the disposition is by lease agreement substantially similar to the original lease agreement and the lease agreement is made in good faith and in a
commercially reasonable manner, the lessor may recover from the lessee as damages
(a) accrued and unpaid rent as of the date of default, (b) the present value as of the
date of default of the difference between the total rent for the remaining lease term
of the original lease agreement and the total rent for the lease term of the new lease
agreement, and (c) any incidental damages allowed under Section 2A-530, less expenses saved in consequence of the lessee's default.
53. U.C.C. § 2A-527 comment (1987).
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This section may prompt the same judicial and scholarly debate
that has attended the Article 2 unconscionability provision.64 Professor Benfield's contribution to the Symposium treats in part the
issues surrounding substantial similarity, and in so doing demonstrates what may be some of Article 2A's shortcomings.!!~ Do the
drafters expect too much of the courts? While Llewellyn's approach to the law contemplated some lawmaking by a judge
deciding a sales case156 in the Grand Style, he did draft Article 2, at
most crucial points, to provide courts some guidance as to how to
effect the proper balance of interests.t~'1 Perhaps it will turn out
that the drafters of Article 2A in their incorporation of the substantially similar lease concept have stopped a bit short of
providing the courts sufficient guidance.
The articles by Professor Benfield, Professor Harris, and
Donald Rapson also pose the larger and more difficult question: do
the Official Comments to Article 2A provide merely a guide to construction and application of the statute, or do they attempt to
make law beyond that contained in the provisions of the Article? It
may be helpful to keep in mind when considering the issue that
the Comments did undergo adjustment for some time after the
drafting of the Article 2A provisions was completed.~
Article 2A also confronts, and occasionally fails to confront,
some of the fundamental issues of increasing concern to the commercial community. As noted above, the Mooney and Kripke
pieces contain important remarks regarding the lack of a filing requirement in Article 2A and the consequent ostensible ownership
problems, or lack of such problems (in Mooney's estimation).
Mooney draws an important distinction between the assumptions
underlying credit transactions and those considerations which gov8

54. See id. § 2-302.
55. Benfield, Lessor's Da17Ulges Under Article 2A After Default by the Lessee as to
Accepted Goods, 39 ALA. L. REv. 915 (1988).
56. It could, however, reasonably be concluded that section 2-207, the "battle of the
forms" provision, contemplates too much judicial lawmaking. See generally Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, T1 STAN. L. REv. 621 (1975).
57. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (1987). Section 2-201(2) describes a procedure that
merchants may utilize to avoid the unjust results often reached under the common law.
That procedure permits the parties to a sales transaction to posture themselves in such a
way that the equities clearly appear. See Alces, Toward a Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at
1325.
58. Letter from Donald J. Rapson to James S. Roberts, Coordinntor, Article 2A Symposium (Aug. 13, 1987).
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ern lease transactions-his remarks have relevance beyond the
scope of the Article 2A debate.
Professor Miller's article addresses the Article 2A provisions
that treat consumer protection issues.G9 Notwithstanding the fact
that the Sales Article includes scant consumer protection legislation, the fact that Article 2A follows that lead is curious. Although
the consumer protection movement was virtually nonexistent at
the time of the UCC's promulgation, the last quarter-century has
seen a tremendous expansion in such legislation. Whole parallel
bodies of payments law, governing credit cards and electronic
funds transfers, have been passed by the states and the federal
government that, in large measure, respond to the perceived anticonsumer bias of the law governing paper-based payment systems. 60 Professor Miller's article explains the relationship between
consumer protection principles and this newest Article of the UCC.
In considering Article 2A's treatment of consumer interests
and the Article's place in relation to consumer protection legislation generally, the issue of the relationship between state and
federal law comes into focus. Why is Article 2A state rather than
federal law at a time when we are witnessing increasing federalization of commercial law? Will the law undergo substantial
amendment in the states and therefore, in the course of the next
few years, cease to be uniform at all? The California initiative suggests that the foregoing question may be more than idle
speculation.61
Related to consumer issues and the question of whether Article 2A is better cast as uniform state or federal law is the new lease
law's reliance on freedom of contract principles. That reliance is
characteristic of the Code, but not all that familiar in federal law.
Also, the major limitations on freedom of contract principles in Article 2A are in consumer settings. For the most part the drafters
trust the negotiation and drafting skills of the sophisticated transactors who are party to the more significant lease deals. Should a
59. Miller, Leases with Consumers under Uniform Commercial Code Article 2A, 39
L. REV. 957 (1988}.
60. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693r (1982) (electronic fund transfers); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666;
(1982 & Supp. II 1984) (credit cards).

ALA.

61.

REPORT OF THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL ConE CoMMI'M'EE OF THE BusiNESS LAw SEC·

TION oF THE STATE BAR oF CALIFORNIA ON PROPOSED CALIFORNIA CoMMERCIAL ConE DIVISION
10 (ARTICLE 2A) (Dec. 1, 1987), reprinted in 39 ALA. L. REV. 979 (1988).
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statute only provide backstop law? To what limitations should the
law be subject? The articles by Professors Harris and Benfield consider the limits of private agreements in the Article 2A scheme.
Finally, students and teachers of commercial law will have to
appraise the success of Article 2A. Professor Kripke finds so many
shortcomings in the promulgated draft of Article 2A that he would
vote against the statute. Most of the other contributors to this
Symposium, some of whom were either involved in the drafting
process or are members of the Permanent Editorial Board, are generally favorable in their assessment of Article 2A's provisions and
qualify their criticisms with remarks praising the overall quality of
the effort. Even in those articles that are the most favorable, the
authors reveal "glitches" in the operation of some of the Article 2A
provisions. Time will tell whether these glitches are minor annoyances or serious stumbling blocks for the courts and transactors.

m

CoNCLUSION

Article 2A of the UCC is a commercial law development that
will remain important for some time to come, even if all of the
states do not immediately embrace the finished draft. This short
introduction to the Symposium has endeavored to suggest the role
this issue of the Alabama Law Review will play in the legal literature and in the development of commercial law. It is crucial that
the commercial bar study and understand Article 2A, particularly
because at the time of this writing debate in the state legislatures
is beginning in earnest. In addition to suggesting the broader issues
concerned, this essay represents something of an initial (albeit
quite modest) effort to encourage commercial law teachers to think
about Article 2A and its place in the law school curriculum. Perhaps more than any development since the initial promulgation of
the UCC, Article 2A forces us to come to terms with the Llewellynesque jurisprudential perspective and its role in the
contemporary commercial law pedagogy.

